Recent Developments by unknown
American Indian Law Review
Volume 6 | Number 2
1-1-1978
Recent Developments
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Family Law Commons, Indian and Aboriginal Law
Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Supreme Court of the United States Commons, Taxation-State
and Local Commons, and the Water Law Commons
This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Recent Developments, 6 Am. Indian L. Rev. 429 (1978),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol6/iss2/8
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ADMINISTRATION: Alaska: Koniag v. Andrus
The power and position of the Secretary of the Interior in Alaskan
Native affairs has been reaffirmed in the United States Supreme
Court's denial of review of this case.' Appellants were eleven
native Alaskan villages seeking eligibility to take certain land and
revenue under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. The
Bureau of Indian Affairs had initially found them eligible, but that
finding was reversed by the Secretary of the Interior. The villages
then sought redress in the federal district court for the District of
Columbia and received a favorable summary judgment. The
court, in effect, reinstated the earlier BIA decision, holding that
the appeal from that decision was made by a party not having
standing (the state of Alaska and certain federal agencies), that the
procedure followed in determining the appeal violated due pro-
cess, and that congressional interference had prejudiced said deter-
mination.3 The Secretary of the Interior then appealed that deci-
sion,' and the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in
turn reversed the lower court holding, although it agreed that
there had been an effective denial of due process.' Accordingly,
the court remanded the case to the Secretary of the Interior for
redetermination.
Appellants then petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari,
arguing that the district court action was correct and proper, and
praying for the reinstatement of the original BIA decision in
bypass of the Secretarial remand.
The Supreme Court, in disposing of the case, agreed with the
district court's finding that there had been a violation of due pro-
cess and a congressional intrusion into a strictly administrative
arena, but found error in the reinstatement of the BIA findings.
The Supreme Court then held that the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service, the United States Forest Service, and the state of
Alaska indeed had standing to appeal the district court result
because of their status as "aggrieved parties" under the regulations
implementing the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. The
status of aggrieved parties was held to exist because the BIA's
1. 99 S.Ct. 733 (1979).
2. 43 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
3. Koniag, Inc. v. Kleppe, 405 F. Supp. 1360 (D.D.C. 1975).
4.5 INDIAN L. RPTR. B-13.
5. Koniag, Inc., the Village of Uyak v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 1601 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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determination of eligibility for the villages could enable those
villages to obtain dominion, under the color of the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act, over lands currently under the state's or
agencies' control.6 The Supreme Court then held that the proper
remedy was that of remand to the Secretary of the Interior,
especially in view of a new Secretary having been appointed since
the original ruling, thus assuring an objective rehearing. In addi-
tion, the Court held that remand was particularly necessary
because the question of redetermination of native residence in the
eligibility process had been reopened because the residence of
native Alaskans had not been conclusively established by the roll
prepared by the previous Secretary pursuant to the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act7 but under undue congressional influence.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Supremacy of the United States
Constitution Over a Conflicting Provision of a Tribal
Constitution'
The Supreme Court denied review of an Eighth Circuit decision in
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, 566 F.2d 1085 (8th Cir.
1977).2 Denial of review left standing the circuit court's decision
that the twenty-sixth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion, which set the voting age at eighteen, shall prevail over the
tribal constitutional provision setting the voting age at twenty-
one.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: Termination of Parental Rights
A petition for review has been filed with the Supreme Court in the
case of Brokenleg v. Butts.' The case concerns the termination of
parental rights over a seven-year-old Sioux Indian child and was
originally brought by the child's paternal grandparents. The
district court entered judgment terminating the rights of the
parents and the mother appealed. The Texas Civil Court of Ap-
peals affirmed in part and reversed in part.2 The first issue ad-
dressed concerned the failure of the parent to provide for the ade-
6. 99 S.Ct. 733 (1979).
7. 43 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
1. See Recent Developments, 6 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 239 (1978).
2. 99 S.Ct. 83 (1978).
1. 47 U.S.L.W. 3113 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1978).
2. l3rokenleg v. Butts, 559 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
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quate support of the child. The court noted that the test under the
Texas Family Code is not whether the parent actually supported
the child but whether arrangements were made for the adequate
support of the child. In this case the evidence was undisputed that
such arrangements had been made. The court then sustained ap-
pellant's point of error, finding error in the trial court's holding
that the best interest of the child required termination of the
parent-child relationship. The court found substantial difference
between suits for conservatorship, possession and support of
children, and those to terminate a parent-child relationship and
concluded that none of the factors compelled termination of the
mother's rights, but that custody should be awarded to the grand-
parents.
EDUCATION: Implementation of Desegregation Plan
In Booker v. Special School District No. 1, 585 F.2d 347 (8th Cir.
1978), public school officials of Minneapolis, Minnesota, ap-
pealed from an order of the district court which refused to grant
relief from an injunction issued against the school officials. The
suit had been brought in 1971 by black students residing in the
district and the plaintiffs were permitted to maintain the action as
a class suit for the benefit of all students in the district, including
white, black, and Indian students. The district court found that
the school district had been racially segregated, that this was due
at least in part to school board action intentionally taken, and that
the segregation had to be eliminated. The decree established
guidelines for allowable percentages of minority students and re-
quired the school board to submit progress reports to the court. In
1978 the board asked for dissolution of the injunction, or alter-
natively, for leave to increase minority enrollments in individual
schools, particularly in schools having a high concentration of In-
dian students. The board argued that the district court erred when
it refused to permit the school district to enroll up to 50 per cent
minority students in any school and up to 60 per cent minority
students in schools having an Indian student population of 30 per
cent or more. The board also argued that a differentiation between
50 per cent and 60 per cent in schools where Indian students are
concentrated is fiecessary if the Indian students are to derive full
benefit from federal programs designed to meet their special
educational needs.
The circuit court noted that while in certain contexts separate
classification and treatment of Indians as a race are constitutional-
ly permissible, the United States Supreme Court has not held that
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a school district is exempt from its obligation to eliminate racial
segregation simply because the district's student population con-
tains a substantial number of Indian students with specialized
educational needs. The Court then affirmed the decision of the
district court to deny total relief from the injunction.
HUNTING AND FISHING RIGHTS: State Regulation
In Sac and Fox Tribe of the Mississippi v. Licklider, 576 F.2d 145
(8th Cir. 1978), an action was brought by the United States and
the Sac and Fox Tribe seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
against Iowa officials to the effect that Iowa has no jurisdiction to
regulate hunting, fishing, and trapping by the tribal members on
land occupied by the tribe. The district court held that Iowa has
jurisdiction to regulate hunting, fishing, and trapping and dis-
missed the action. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the district court, holding that (1) the federal
government has created, with the statutory consent and coopera-
tion of the state of Iowa, a de facto Indian reservation in Tama
County, Iowa, and (2) since a reading of the 1842 treaty between
the United States and the Sac and Fox Indian tribe showed that the
tribe yielded up its aboriginal rights to hunt, fish, and trap on
reservation land in Iowa, and since Congress acceded to Iowa's
statutory withholding of jurisdiction over all crimes against the
state, except those enumerated in the Federal Major Crimes Act,
Congress has recognized the state of Iowa's jurisdiction to enforce
its fish and game laws on the reservation. The Supreme Court, in
November, 1978, denied the tribe's petition for writ of certiorari.'
INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION: Recovery of Monies
Wrongfully Collected
United States v. Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community,
586 F.2d 209 (Ct. C1. 1978) involved a claim against the federal
government to recover monies alleged to have been wrongfully
collected from the community. The charges collected were for the
operation and maintenance of an irrigation system, construction
of which was provided for in the San Carlos Act, Act of June 7,
1924, ch. 288, 43 Stat. 475. The Indian Claims Commission held
that the government was without authority to collect the fees and
the Court of Claims affirmed the decision but modified the award.
The main issue, stated the Court of Claims, was one of congres-
1. 99 S.Ct. 353 (1978).
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sional intent. The government raised the question of whether Con-
gress intended the Indians to pay operation and maintenance
charges. The Indians said no; the government said yes. In order to
answer this question, the court looked to the language of the
statute and concluded that the Act was primarily intended to pro-
vide the Indians with water and an interpretation that the Indian
lands were liable for the operation and maintenance charges was
repugnant to the congressional purpose of the Act. The court,
however, modified the award of damages as to interest, stating
that interest can be awarded only where a statute specifically
allows for interest to be paid.
INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION: Requirement to Award Profits
Garnered From Tribal Land Wrongfully Allotted to Nonmembers
of Indian Nation
In denying certiorari, the Supreme Court left standing a decision
of the United States Court of Claims in Creek Nation v. United
States. The Court held that the Indian Claims Commission was
not required to award actual profits from oil and gas garnered
from tribal land that was wrongfully allotted by the government
to nonmembers of the Indian nation. The Court of Claims also
held that it was within its discretion in deciding that the lands
should be valued as of the date of "taking."' The uniform practice
in all such "taking" of land cases under the "fair and honorable
dealings" clause of the Indian Claims Commission Act has been to
use fair value of taken land as of date of "taking."
JURISDICTION: Constitutionality of State Statute Authorizing
State to Assume Jurisdiction Over Tribes Without Tribal Request
In State of Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of
Yakima Indian Nation, 47 U.S.L. W 4111 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1979), the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Washington
state statute which obligates the state to assume civil and criminal
jurisdiction over Indians and Indian territory in the state.
Specifically, the statute requires the state to assume jurisdiction on
trust or restricted lands in eight subject-matter areas: (1) com-
pulsory school attendance, (2) public assistance, (3) domestic rela-
tions, (4) mental illness, (5) juvenile delinquency, (6) adoption
proceedings, (7) dependent children, and (8) operation of motor
1. 47 U.S.L.W. 3209 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1978) in which Creek Nation v. United States, -Ct.
CI.- (Apr. 4, 1978,) is discussed.
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vehicles on the public streets, alleys, roads, and highways.
Assumption of jurisdiction by the state in other subject-matter
areas is authorized only upon request by the tribe. Thus, state
aufhority over Indians within the Yakima Reservation depends on
the title status of the property on which the offense or transaction
occurred and upon the nature of the subject-matter.
The Yakima Nation, which had not made a request for the state
to assume jurisdiction over its lands, brought suit challenging the
statutory and constitutional validity of the state of Washington's
assertion of partial jurisdiction on its reservation. The Yakima Na-
tion claimed that the state of Washington had not met the
statutory requirements of Public Law 280 nor the requirements of
equal protection contained in the fourteenth amendment.
The district court rejected the claims of the Yakima Nation and
decided the case in favor of the state. The Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court, holding that partial assumption of criminal and
civil jurisdiction without the consent of the tribe was invalid.' The
court concluded that the "checkerboard" jurisdictional system it
produced was without any rational foundation and therefore
violated the fourteenth amendment.
T[he Supreme Court accepted appeal by the state of
Washington, requesting that the parties address the following
issue: Is the partial geographic and subject-matter jurisdiction or-
dained by the Washington state statute authorized by federal law
as well as the equal protection clause of the Constitution? The
Court noted that the state of Washington was relying on Public
Law 280 for authority to assert its jurisdiction over the Yakima
Reservation. States whose constitutions or statutes contain
organic law disclaimers of jurisdiction over Indian country are
dealt with in Section 6 of that statute. Washington state, whose
constitution contains such a disclaimer, is therefore covered by
Section 6 of Public Law 280, the provisions of which give states
the permission to amend "where necessary" their state constitu-
tions or statutes to remove any legal impediment to the assump-
tion of jurisdiction under the Act.
The Supreme Court first considered the necessity of the state of
Washington amending its constitution before it could validly
legislate under the authority of Public Law 280. After discussing
legislative, statutory, and historical materials, the Court conclud-
ed that Section 6 of Public Law 280 does not require Washington
to amend its constitution in order to make an effective acceptance
1. 552 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1978).
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of jurisdiction. The Court then addressed the question of
Washington's assumption of only partial subject-matter and
geographic jurisdiction over the reservation. The tribe contended
that because partial assumption of jurisdiction was not specifically
authorized, it must therefore be forbidden. The Court, however,
found authority for partial assumption of jurisdiction in Section 7
of Public Law 280, which permits assumption of jurisdiction "at
such time and in such manner as the people of the State
shall.., obligate and bind the State to the assumption thereof."
The third issue which the Court addressed was the validity of the
"checkerboard" pattern of jurisdiction on the reservation of non-
consenting tribes. The Court noted that legislative classifications,
under conventional equal protection clause criteria, are valid
unless they bear no rational relationship to the state's objectives.
The Court found that the statute was fairly calculated to further
the state's interest in providing protection to non-Indians living
within the boundaries of a reservation, while at the same time
allowing scope for tribal self-government. For these reasons, the
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and
held in favor of the state of Washington.
JURISDICTION: State Criminal Jurisdiction On Indian Trust
Allotment Land
In a recent opinion, the Oklahoma State Attorney General ex-
plored the relationship of state criminal jurisdiction to Indian trust
allotment land. The two areas of concern were:
1. Does the state of Oklahoma have criminal jurisdiction over
Indian versus Indian crimes occurring upon Indian trust allotment
land?
2. If the answer to the first question is in the negative, can state,
county, and municipal officers nevertheless accept Deputy Special
Officer commissions issued by the Area BIA Director for the pur-
pose of cooperating with federal law enforcement officials in the
maintenance of law and order in Indian country (as that term is
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151)?
In brief, the answers delivered were, respectively, no and yes.
The Attorney General began with the postulate that only Con-
gress has the power to limit, modify, or eliminate tribal powers of
self-government. 2 Therefore, state jurisdiction over Indians may
be obtained only by express delegation of congressional authority
1. 78 Op. Att'y Gen. 176 (Okla. 1978).
2. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
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or by the involvement of non-Indian parties in the dispute.
Neither condition was present in this situation. Similarly, the At-
torney General found no evidence of any intent within
Oklahoma's legislative history to confer jurisdiction of Indian af-
fairs upon the state. The Attorney General then examined the Ma-
jor Crimes Act,3 which vests exclusive jurisdiction over Indians
committing any of ten named crimes in Indian country in the
United States. The Act defines "Indian country" partly as follows:
"all Indian allotments, the titles to which have not been ex-
tinguished .... . The Attorney General used this language as a
basis for his theory that the jurisdiction in question had been
preempted by the federal government. As additional support for
his conclusion, the Attorney General referred to DeCoteau v.
Ditrict County Court.' In DeCoteau, the Supreme Court held
that Indian conduct on trust allotment land is "solely the concern
of tribal or federal authorities,"6 and is therefore beyond the state's
jurisdiction.
The Attorney General did not see this doctrine as a universal ex-
clusion of state authority in Indian criminal matters, but rather
held that an Indian suspected of committing a crime in Indian
country could be legitimately apprehended by state officers if he
were outside Indian country at the time and could be subsequently
held for federal prosecution.7 Nevertheless, no state jurisdiction
would lie at trial. The Attorney General likewise held, in ex-
trapolation, that even if a crime not within the purview of the Ma-
jor Crimes Act were committed in Indian country where there was
no formal system of tribal law, the jurisdiction would still vest in
the United States by virtue of the Assimilative Crimes Act8 if such
action was a violation of state law. In other words, a crime under
state law but not under federal law (the Major Crimes Act),
without a proper forum (tribal court), would still be a crime
because of the state's proscription, and it would be tried as such,
but in federal court. Federal jurisdiction thereby preempts the
states also in regard to misdemeanors not disposed of at the tribal
level; but the authority to apprehend in connection therewith may
still be exercised, under the appropriate conditions, by state of-
ficials.
3. Act. of Mar. 3, 1885; 18 U.S.C. §1153 (1970).
4. 18 U.S.C § 1151 (1970).
5. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
6. 78 Op. Att'y Gen. 176 (Okla. 1978), at 8.
7. Id., at 8-9.
8. Act of June 25, 1948; 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
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The Attorney General dealt with the issue of cross-deputization
in somewhat shorter form. Normally, such a practice between
state and federal officials would be prohibited by Article 2, Sec-
tion 12 of the Oklahoma constitution, as it would constitute dual
office-holding. Nonetheless, the Attorney General found Article
2, Section 12 to be inapplicable to the issuance of Deputy Special
Officer commissions because those commissions do not confer ad-
ditional offices upon the holders, and they are temporary and
nonremunerative in nature. In addition, the Attorney General
found no current sanctions upon the employment of such devices.
Describing Deputy Special Officer commissions as practical, the
Attorney General found no reason to discontinue their usage.
TAXATION: State Sales Tax
The denial by the Supreme Court of the Ute Indian Tribe's petition
for certiorari left standing the Tenth Circuit's holding in Ute In-
dian Tribe v. State Tax Commission, 574 F.2d 1007 (loth Cir.
1978), that state sales tax may be applied to purchases by non-
Indians on Indian lands.1 The action had originally been brought
by the tribe seeking a declaratory judgment that the state could
not levy or collect tax on the sales of personal property on the Uin-
tah or Ouray reservations and injunctive relief. The tribe also asked
for the return of funds that had been collected by the tribe and
remitted to the state. The trial court enjoined the state from col-
lecting the tax and directed the return of the money collected. The
court of appeals, reversing the trial court, based its holding on
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes,2 which held that
sales by tribal enterprises to non-Indians on the reservation are
subject to state sales tax.
TAXATION: State Sales and Motor Vehicle Excise Tax
In Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation v. State,
446 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978), the tribes of the Colville
Reservation, the Lummi and Makah tribes, brought an action
challenging the state's attempted imposition and collection of
taxes of on-reservation sales by tribally licensed retailers to non-
Indians. The district court held (1) that the state of Washington
could not tax on-reservation sales because such state taxation has
been preempted by tribal tax ordinances and such taxation would
1. 99 S. Ct. 452 (1978).
2. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
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constitute an unreasonable interference with tribal self-
government; (2) imposition of the state motor vehicle tax with
respect to vehicles owned by the tribes or reservation resident
members was unlawful; (3) imposition of the state's sales tax on
tribal cigarette sales was preempted by the tribal cigarette tax or-
dinances, but (4) application of the state sales tax to sales at-
tributable to the tribe's noncigarette businesses was not preempted
and was not an interference with tribal self-government.
TRIBAL PROPERTY: Duty of Municipality to Provide Water and
Sewage Service
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case of McMasters v.
Chase, 573 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1978).' The denial of certiorari
leaves standing the circuit court's decision that an enrolled
member of the Three Affiliated Indian Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation in North Dakota has a cause of action against city of-
ficials for their refusal to deliver water and sewer services on trust
lands. Plaintiff Chase and her husband bought land within the city
limits of New Town, North Dakota, which is located within the
Fort Berthold Reservation. A year later they conveyed the title to
the land to the United States government in trust for plaintiff
Chase pursuant to Section 465 of the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934. The Chases then applied to the city council for connection to
city sewer and water lines, but the council delayed action on the
request until it could obtain legal advice as to whether it was re-
quired to provide such service to trust land. Plaintiff then filed suit
for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3).2 The plaintiff alleged that the city's
refusal to allow her to connect her home to city sewer and water
lines violated her right to equal protection of the laws and de-
prived her of a statutory right to have her land, held in trust for
her by the United States, exempt from local taxes. The district
court dismissed the Section 1985(3) claim and denied injunctive
relief.
The court of appeals held that (1) the Secretary of the Interior
could properly accept conveyance of title to property in trust for
the United States for benefit of an individual Indian pursuant to
the Indian Reorganization Act; (2) the complaint was sufficient to
state a cause of action and defendant's refusal to connect property
held in trust to city sewer and water lines was violative of plain-
1. 99 S.Ct. 453 (1978).
2. Chase v. McMasters, 405 F. Supp. 1297 (D.N.D. 1975).
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tiff's statutory right to be exempt from local taxes; and (3) the ac-
tion of the defendants was precluded by the supremacy clause of
the United States Constitution because it impaired plaintiff's right
to enjoy beneficial use of trust land and thereby interfered with the
operation of an important means of implementing a policy
adopted by the federal government to meet its trust obligations to
Indian tribes. However, the court of appeals also held that the
defendants could not be held liable for failure to predict judicial
resolution of the issue and hence were immune from liability for
damages.
TRIBAL PROPERTY: Shifting Boundary Due to River Movement
In Omaha Indian Tribe v. Wilson' the tribe and the United States
sued to quiet title to land, including state and reservation boun-
dary determinations, which had been affected by movement of the
Missouri River. The action involved 2,900 acres of land which had
changed from the west to the east side of the river. The district
court decided that the reservation boundary shifted with the
movements of the river and recognized title in the non-Indian
farmers. The court found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove
that the river movements were controlled by the doctrine of avul-
sion and held that the river had changed by reason of the erosion
of reservation land and accretion to Iowa riparian land.
The circuit court vacated and remanded the decision of the
district court, holding that (1) the trial court erred in failing to ap-
ply federal common law, which was required because the con-
troversy involved both interstate boundaries and the trust rela-
tionship doctrine; (2) the trial court erred in placing the burden of
proof on the government and the tribe; and (3) the evidence was
insufficient to satisfy the defendant's burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that erosion and accretion and not
avulsion were responsible for the change in the course of the
river.'
Review has been granted by the Supreme Court Questions
presented are: (1) Did the Eighth Circuit erroneously construe 25
U.S.C. § 194, involving the question of who must assume the
burden of proof; and (2) Did the Eighth Circuit err in holding that
federal and not state common law was applicable with regard to
accretion and avulsion?'
1. 433 F. Supp. 67 (N.D. Iowa 1977).
2. 575 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1978).
3. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 99 S.Ct. 448 (1978).
4. 47 U.S.L.W. 3326 (U.S. Nov. 14,1978).
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WATER RIGHTS: Arizona v. California
The issue of water rights to the Colorado River is once more of
current interest as five tribes have petitioned to the Supreme Court
for a rehearing of the case. The case itself is not new, having been
originally decided by the Supreme Court in 1964' and amended at
that level two years later.' It is, however, a complex one, involv-
ing several states, numerous public and private irrigation projects,
and many Indian tribes, represented by the United States in a
trustee capacity. A decree apportioning the water rights to the
Colorado River had been referred to a Special Master for finaliza-
tion, but the disposition of that case received less than widespread
popular support. As a result, the case is once again before the
United States Supreme Court. Oral argument was heard on Oc-
tober 10, 1978, regarding motions by the five Indian tribes to in-
tervene directly in the case.
The Cocopah and Colorado River Indian tribes sought the
determination of water rights to land that was determined to be
within the boundaries of their reservations after the 1964 decision.
The Chemehuevi, Fort Yuma-Quechan, and Fort Mojave Indian
tribes wished to intervene directly in the case because of their
claim to inadequate representation by the United States due to
conflict of interest between the tribes and the Departments of
Justice and Interior as to final adjudication of water rights. In ad-
dition, all five tribes have argued that the prior decree is confusing
and ambiguous and does not sufficiently protect Indian water
rights, and therefore the decree should be restructured. The
representation argument, if successful, has the potential to alter
permanently the concept of the federal trust relationship.
The Court ruled on the joint motion to enter a supplemental
decree and motion for leave to intervene on January 9, 19792 In
stating that the parties (meaning the states and the United States)
had agreed to "present perfected rights" to the use of the
mainstream water of the Colorado River, the Court said:
(2) This determination shall in no way affect future ad-
justments resulting from determinations relating to settle-
ment of Indian reservation boundaries ....
(5) In the event of a determination of insufficient mainstream
water to satisfy present perfected rights.., the Secretary of
1. 376 U.S. 340 (1964).
2. 383 U.S. 268 (1966).
3.47U.S.L.W. 4105 (U.S. Jan. 9,1979).
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the Interior shall, before providing for the satisfaction of any
of the other present perfected rights except for those labeled
herein as "miscellaneous present perfected rights" [specific
lots belonging to individual private owners].., first provide
for the satisfaction in full of all rights of the [Chemehuevi,
Cocopah, Fort Yuma, Colorado River, and Fort Mojave] In-
dian Reservations ....
The Court included a provision for the continuing adjustment
of water rights as the boundaries of the reservations concerned
were settled. These adjustments are to be in "quantities not ex-
ceeding the quantities of water needed to irrigate" the number of
acres determined to be within the reservation. In formulating this
requirement, the Court has applied its own method for calculating
the amount of water each tribe qualifies for as follows: "The
number of practicably irrigable acres (x) a set number of acre-feet
of water. [Numbers ranging from 5.97 (Chemehuevi) to 6.67 (Ft.
Yuma) with those for the other tribes falling somewhere in
between.]"
This is not to be interpreted as restrictive of the tribes' use of the
water solely to the purposes of irrigation, however, as the Court
also held that: "The foregoing reference to a quantity of water
necessary to supply consumptive use required for
irrigation.., shall constitute the means of determining quantity of
adjudicated water rights but shall not constitute a restriction of the
usage of them to irrigation or other agricultural application."' It
may be noted from that statement that although the use of the
water is unrestricted, the method of determining its amount in all
cases is tied to the amount of "irrigable" land within the boun-
daries of the reservation.
The Court then appointed as Special Master Judge Elbert P.
Tuttle for the hearing of all subsequent pleadings and proceedings.
All other facets of the motion to intervene were referred to him,
save one. The motion to oppose the entry of a supplemental
decree because of inadequate representation was summarily
denied."
4. Id.
5. 47 U.S.L.W. 4109 (U.S. Jan. 9,1979).
6. Id.
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